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UPI Feature Story:
The Great Escape

Copyright © 2002 UPI  

By Martin Arostegui
From the
International Desk
Published 2/22/2002 7:21 PM

The U.S. may have come within a hairís breadth of getting Osama Bin Laden a week ago but failed, UPI can confirm through local Afghan intelligence sources running surveillance on a string of villages along the border with Pakistan where the fugitive terrorist leader was believed to be hiding.

While a CIA operated unmanned drone aircraft fired a Hellfire missile on a vehicle convoy last Monday which reportedly killed two of Bin Ladenís chief lieutenants,  Afghan Northern Alliance forces were independently preparing to raid the village of Kut Tangai where a group  Al Qaida leaders and heavily armed bodyguards had been spotted since last December.

Local informants who reported Bin Ladenís suspected whereabouts to an American civilian military advisor working with Afghans, had been afraid to inform the U.S. military because it could trigger B-52 air strikes which could pulverize their villages and kill their families, U.P.I. has learned. 

The same sources report that two powerful local warlords who are helping to hide Al Qaida were also exerting pressures on local inhabitants not to divulge information on the presence of the terrorists whom they were protecting.

Since the failed drone missile attack, U.S. Special Forces have occupied  Kut Tangai and surrounding villages  where some 24 top level Al Qaida members presumed to include Bin Laden had been moving secretly for over a month.

ìThe Americans have come in with helicopters, Humvees and motorcycles, passing around money to obtain information from  villagersî a local source tells UPI. But the fugitives are believed to have fled to other hiding places in the surrounding Spin Gar Mountains or across into Pakistan according to a one time Afghan intelligence official and native of the area who told  UPI  about the possible presence of Bin Laden in the southern province of Nangahar, a week ago. 

UPI did not publish the report at the time as it could compromise the planned raid by a pro-government commander and an American Green Beret working with the Afghan United Front or Northern Alliance which controls key security ministries in the Afghan interim administration. 

Forensic experts have been combing the area where the missile struck for DNA samples from scattered parts of dead bodies, with the hope of finding possible traces of Bin Laden. U.S, intelligence officers operating the unmanned drone, reportedly  fired its remote controlled missile when the aircraftís video camera relayed images of a group of Al Qaida suspects bowing to a tall man getting into a 4X4 vehicle, according to the The New York Times. The group was believed to be on its way to Pakistan.

Northern Alliance Panshir Commandos with Jack, the American Green Beret that found bin Laden in the mountain village of Dehbala and were preparing to mount their attack when CIA/USAF Hellfire missiles hit prematurely.

Al Qaidaís great escape began in mid December when a group of its top leaders made it down steep mountain passes from the Tora Bora cave complex being pummeled by American B-52s, to meet up with vehicles provided by Leaz Khel, a Pakistan based local warlord with long standing ties to the Taliban and Al Qaida.

In an ingenious deception , the fugitives boarded a ìflying carpetî or public transport buss intended to deceive U.S. air and satellite reconnaissance. After driving all day, the busses met up with  4X4 vehicles into which the Al Qaida VIPs transferred for the rough trek  to Kut Tangai along a mountain range bordering Pakistan which was not being targeted by American airstrikes.         

The hideout was mainly chosen due to its inaccessibility. At an elevation of 12,000 ft above sea level, the village has no road connections with any other town.  Bin Laden was known to have used Kut Tangai as a spiritual retreat prior to the war.

Although the local informant could not determine the precise identities of the fugitives, he could tell that there were two distinct groups. The local resident who was a Russian trained intelligence official in pre Taliban governments, observed how 6ñ8 of them, presumed to be the Al Qaida leaders, were treated with great deference by a larger group of 18 other men believed to be their servants or bodyguards.  The two groups also lived in separate houses, according to the source.

ìI immediately suspected Bin Laden was one of themî says Jack, the American advisor to the Afghan Northern Alliance who was first informed about the location of the fugitives on December 18 while he was on a trip to Jalalabad. ìOnly the top top of Al Qaida would be protected and treated in that way.î

ìThe bodyguards were passing money around the villagersî says the informant who talked to UPI under condition of anonymity under the pseudonym Daoud. ìTheir leaders only moved outdoors at night.î

ìYou give me your word that you will go in there and take out these guys without using bombers,î Daoud demanded as a condition as he began informing Jack to on the  Al Qaidaís fugitives.  Already  critical of what he considered an excessive reliance on heavy bomber strikes by the U.S, Jack agreed.

ìB-52s were being used in situations where low flying helicopter gunships and ground attack aircraft would have been more effective,î says the Green Beret. ìNot only were we failing to destroy Al Qaidaís mountain hideouts. But the fear of massive airstrikes was inhibiting local people from passing information on Al Qaida movements.î

As far back as November, Jack and active duty U.S. Special Forces officers had requested specialized A-10 aircraft for better close air support but the U.S. Central Command failed to deliver them.  Fearing that his advice would be ignored again, Jack decided against passing on the latest leads on Al Qaida to the U.S. government.

At a later meeting on 12 January, Daoud informed Jack that members of the Al Qaida fugitive group were going into nearby villages searching for medical supplies which indicated that at least one of them was wounded or sick. Heavy snow on the frontier mountain passes also blocked the fugitives from escaping into Pakistan. Jack sent Daoud back to conduct further surveillance.

ìTheir precise location had yet to be determined. We also needed to know the exact numbers of Al Qaida, their dispositions and their armaments before we could launch a raid,î says Jack.  Communications with Daoud were difficult, having to be conducted through cut outs or go betweens as neither Jack or any other American could go near Kut Tangai without being compromised.

At a meeting in Jalalabad on February 2 in which UPI was present, Daoud informed Jack that the Al Qaida party had moved into a smaller neighboring village which was closer to Pakistan in northern Paktia province where they were positioned to make a run to the border.

ìThe Pakistani army would not be a problem,î was Daoudís opinion. ìThey wouldnít stop Al Qaida fugitives. A commander in the Pakistani army was arranging the cross border movementsî for important members of the group. Both Leaz Kheel and another  powerful local warlord  protecting Al Qaida, Yunis Khalis, had expensive homes and high level connections in Pakistan, we were told.

Three wounded Al Qaida members had been smuggled across the border in recent weeks according to informants who also said that the warlords had been given money in Pakistan to protect Al Qaida. Itís even reported that they was taking Taliban and Al Qaida soldiers into their own armies which otherwise lacked trained recruits.

A high level intelligence source in Afghanistanís Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed for UPI, that both warlords have a reputation of being pro Taliban sympathizers who gave the appearance of changing sides for convenience. ìWhen the Taliban were ousted, they just took off their turbans. They would take money from Al Qaida but at one point were also accepting support from the British.î   

Daoud was given a Pentax mini zoom camera to do a further reconnaissance of the new location where the terrorists were hiding and Jack went to General Hazrat Ali to recruit 200 of his men for the raid which would have to take place in the next few days.    

Daoud was taking pictures of the Al Qaida hideout just 2 days prior to the attack by the Drone aircraft.  He had reported that the group was occupying 2 different houses and were heavily armed with RPG rocket launchers, heavy PK machineguns and new Iranian made AKS 74 automatic rifles.  The assault on bin Laden was on schedule, but Jack didnít have time to assemble and train the necessary force to conduct the raid on the village when one group of seven fugitives made the long expected dash to Pakistan, and were hit by the U.S. Hellfire missile. Jack had been ready to go anyway.

Daoud reports that the  Al Qaida survivors managed to escape 24 hours before U.S. Special Forces reached the area. ìAl Qaida moved out of the village and may have gone into a mountain cave. Before America had the caves targeted. Now they donít know where they are,î he says.  

 

Copyright © 2002 United Press International
 



General Hazrat Ali and Commander Sami Ali worked with Jack for three years, calling him their greatest ally and friend against al-Qaida and the Taliban.  It was those fiercely independent yet loyal troops that had followed Jack into the Kut Tangai mountains after approval from General Mohammed Fahim, Minister of Defense, in search of bin Laden.  This was the last time Osama bin Laden was ever spotted.